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COMMENTARY
THE DANGERS OF REFORM: A COMMENT ON
SENATOR CHILES' POSITION ON PACS
Wilbur C. Leatherberry*
In a recent Journal of Legislation article, Senator Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) re-
vived Jesse Unruh's celebrated statement that money is the "mother's milk of
politics."' Senator Chiles, however, is less sanguine than Unruh about the rela-
tionship between money and politics. In his article, Senator Chiles explores ways
to reduce the corrupting influence of political money, focusing particularly upon
the money raised and spent by political action committees (PACs). Like many
Democrats,2 Senator Chiles argues that the increased power of PACs, particularly
those related to or organized by business lobbies, has seriously damaged the
American political process.3 Although he discusses proposed reforms, the Sena-
tor fails to recommend any specific legislation. Instead, he proposes a bipartisan
study commission to develop "concrete legislative recommendations" for reform.4
This commentary will examine Senator Chiles' article from three perspectives:
the need for reform, the particular reform proposals which he discussed, and the
proposed study commission. As will be apparent from the discussion which fol-
lows, I no longer share the Senator's views regarding campaign financing. Indeed,
after studying campaign financing over the past several years, I believe that Sena-
tor Chiles' position exaggerates the need for reforms.5 Because of this exaggerated
perception of the need for reform, proposals have been advanced which are likely
to create more serious problems than the ones they seek to solve.6
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School; A.B. Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity, 1965; J.D. Case Western Reserve University Law School, 1968.
1. Chiles, PAC's: Congress on the Auction Block, 11 J. LEGIS. 193, 193 (1984) (citing Wright, Politics and
the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1004 (1976) (statement of Jesse Unruh, former
Speaker of the California Assembly and present California State Treasurer)). For a brief synopsis of
Senator Chiles article see 1984 A.B.A. J. at 212-13.
2. See, e.g., Campaign Finance Reform Proposals of 1983: Hearings on the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, As Amended and on Various Measures to Amend the Act before the Senate Comm. on Rules
and Admin., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1983) (Statement of Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis.); See also
Campaign Finance Hearings, supra at 49 (statement of Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton, D-Mo.).
3. Chiles, supra note 1, at 208-11.
4. Id. at 216.
5. Id. at 193-95.
6. The most widely supported reform plan, H.R. 4970, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 20,980
(1979) (this bill was the Campaign Contributions Reform Act of 1979, also known as the Obey-Rail-
sback Amendment) proposed a combination of primary and general election contribution ceilings and
a limit of PAC contributions to $6,000 per candidate. H.R. 4970 also placed a $70,000 ceiling on the
amount a candidate could accept from multi-candidate committees. Other proposed reform legislation
included: (1) bills to reduce the influence of individual PACs; (2) bills to reduce candidate dependence
on PACs; (3) bills to increase the influence of political parties and individuals; and (4) bills for public
financing of all federal elections. See, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITTEES: THEIR EVOLUTION AND GROWTH AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM 55 (1982) (prepared by Joseph E. Cantor). I have expressed my views more fully in a recently
published article: Leatherberry, Rethinking Regulation of Independent Expenditures by PAC's, 35
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 13 (1984).
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THE NEED FOR REFORM
In his article, Senator Chiles cites figures on PAC growth since 1974, 7 when
the Federal Election Campaign Act was amended. He expresses concern that, be-
cause of this growth "the integrity of the political process . . . may be compro-
mised."' In surveying the history of PACs, he describes how unions initially
created PACs9 and how business and trade groups discovered the device much
later."o The Senator then observes that the campaign reform law ironically "en-
couraged PAC development and strengthened [the] role [of PACs] in the electoral
process."" The "irony" of this result may be more apparent than real, however,
since many commentators have described the 1974 legislation 12 as a deliberate
attempt by Democrats to skew the financial balance in their favor by sanctioning
PACs.t3 Support for this view is provided by the observation that unions, the
organizations that created PACs, historically have supported the Democratic
Party. In any event, the 1974 Act was instrumental in the PAC explosion.
Senator Chiles' concern about excessive participation by PACs seems ill-
founded. Despite some restrictions, corporations and labor unions, the entities
which typically have founded PACs, have participated in campaigns for years.
Moreover, it has not been established that the percentage of interest group money
spent in campaigns is greater now than before. PACs actually add an additional
measure of accountability because financial disclosure requirements imposed on
them make it easier to determine how much particular interest groups spend on
campaigns. 5 Previously, interest groups employed various evasive measures to
circumvent the contribution restrictions.1 6
Senator Chiles' discussion largely ignores the growth of ideological PACs. The
growth in influence of these PACs represents a striking development in this area.
Ideological PACs like the National Conservative Political Action Committee
(NCPAC), for example, represent only 15 percent of all PACs, but spend nearly
30 percent of total PAC funds. 7 Nevertheless, Senator Chiles focuses almost ex-
clusively upon PACs sponsored by corporations, labor unions, and trade
associations. "
Senator Chiles recounts the legislative debate over whether PACs should be
subject to a higher campaign contribution limit than individuals.' 9 The legislative
7. Chiles, supra note 1, at 194.
8. Id. at 195.
9. Id. at 195.
10. Id. at 195-98.
11. Id. at 201.
12. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-1503, 18 U.S.C. §§ 591, 608, 611, 613-617, 26 U.S.C. §§ 276, 6012, 9002-9012, 9031-9042, 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
13. Republicans pointed out in debate that the legislation was designed to help the Democrats who were in
control of both houses of Congress at the time. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 8,469 (1974) (statement of
Sen. Buckley (R-N.Y.)); id. at 9,540 (reprinting an article from CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR sug-
gesting that the bill was designed to protect incumbents, most of whom were Democrats). Professor
Ralph Winter described the enactment of this reform legislation as "not the cleansing of the political
process but the skewing." Id. at 10,561. He also suggested that unions wanted to limit private contri-
butions so that their power would be enhanced due to their ability to provide indirect contributions.
Id.
14. See Malbin, Neither a Mountain nor a Molehill, REG. 41, 42 (May/June, 1979); Epstein, The PAC
Phenomenon: An Overview, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 355, 357-58 (1980); Budde, The Practical Role of Corpo-
rate PAC's in the Political Process, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 555, 559-60 (1980).
15. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION 129 (1983).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Chiles, supra note 1, at 202-04.
19. Id. at 201-04.
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history indicates that the prevailing view in Congress was that PACs simply ag-
gregate the funds and interests of individual donors rather than represent the in-
terests of the sponsoring organization.2" The higher contribution limits enacted in
1974 ($5,000 for the large PACs rather than the $1,000 limit which applies to
individuals and small PACs)2' apply to all large PACs whether they are con-
nected (sponsored by a corporation, union, or trade association) or non-connected
(sustained entirely by contributions from individuals).22
Senator Chiles and others assert that the political process is subject to PAC
domination.23 Implicit in this concern is the assumption that PACs generally
support more conservative, pro-business candidates thereby tending to enhance
the Republicans' traditional financial advantage over the Democrats. In fact, how-
ever, evidence fails to support this assumption; most PAC money flows to
incumbents.2 4
Senator Chiles' assumption, however, does appear valid if restricted to open-
seat elections. In those contests, the majority of PAC funds have traditionally
flowed to Republican candidates."z Thus, liberal power in Congress may eventu-
ally begin to decline if the historical tendency of connected PACs to support in-
cumbents remains unchanged.2 6 Moreover, politically conservative individual
PAC contributors, who tend to fund non-connected PACs, outnumber liberal
PAC contributors by a margin of two to one.27 Nevertheless, Democrats have
continued to compete well for contributions made by connected PACs, largely
because the Democratic Party has more incumbents than the Republican Party
and because union and other connected PACs give predominantly to Demo-
crats.28 In addition, it may be true, as Elizabeth Drew asserts, that Democrats
have changed their political stripes in their eagerness to get money from business
and trade association PACs.2 9 It seems more likely, though, that they are simply
acquiescing to the conservative mood of the electorate.
Unlike the connected PACs, the non-connected PACs tend to be more ideo-
logical and less concerned with supporting incumbents. In 1982, of the ten largest
nonconnected PACs, the conservative PACs spent nearly five times as much as
20. Id. at 202-03.
21. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)(A) & (2)(A) (1983) and Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 608(e)(1), 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (1974).
22. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)(A) & (2)(A) (1983).
23. Chiles, supra note 1, at 208; E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION 4,
38-52, 84-93 (1983); Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle
to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 636-39 (1982).
24. In 1980, PACs gave three times as much to incumbents as to challengers. 1 FED. ELECTION COMM.,
FEC REPORTS ON FINANCIAL ACTIVITY 1981-82: INTERIM REPORT 4, PARTY AND NON-PARTY
POLITICAL COMMITTEES 100-02 (1983) (hereinafter cited as 1981-82 FEC REPORT).
25. In 1980, Republicans running for open seats in the Senate received twice as much total PAC support
as Democrats. Corporate PACs gave about ten times as much financial support to Republicans as they
did to Democrats in those races. Union PACs gave under $400,000 in these races, as compared to
nearly $1.35 million for corporate PACs, and only $30,000 of union money went to Republicans.
Democrats did slightly better than Republicans in total PAC support in House races for open seats
because corporate PACs gave one-fourth of their more than $2.5 million to Democrats, but union
PACs gave less than 5% of their $2.6 million total to Republicans. Id.
Democrats continued to do well in collecting PAC money for the 1984 election. As of May 1,
1984, 93% of PAC contributions in House races went to incumbents, and Democrats had raised a
larger percentage of their total funds from PACs than did Republicans. Jackson, House Reelection
Campaigns, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1984, at 62, col. 1.
26. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
27. There are seven million potential liberal donors and about fourteen million conservatives. 39 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1905, 1906 (1981).
28. See supra notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text.
29. E. DREW, supra note 23, at 38-52.
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the liberal PACs.3° Such ideological PACs have successfully raised large sums of
money by aggregating enormous numbers of small contributions. 31 To take full
advantage of this aggregation, many of these PACs avoid the $5,000 campaign
contribution limit by making "independent expenditures" for media advertise-
ments, which either support their candidates or attack the opposition. These ex-
penditures are statutorily permissible if they are not controlled by or coordinated
with a candidate's campaign.3 2
Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo,3 3 non-connected PACs
may engage in independent spending on a grand scale. In Buckley, the Court
struck down all Congressionally enacted spending limits, except the limit on
spending by publicly-financed presidential candidates.34 The Court held that
spending, whether by a candidate or an independent person, was direct speech.
Such speech could not be constitutionally limited since it did not present corrup-
tion risks similar to those arising from direct contributions to candidates.35
Unlike the connected PACs, which may use funds supplied by their sponsor-
ing organization to cover their administrative and fundraising costs,3 6 noncon-
30. Of the ten PACs reporting the largest independent expenditures in the 1982 election, the seven largest
spenders were conservative and the remaining three were liberal. Of the sums spent, about $4.3 million
was negative (i e., attacking the opposing candidate), while only about $943,000 was supportive of a
candidate. Only three of these ten largest-spending PACs were connected to another organization and
all three support conservative causes: the National Rifle Association; the American Medical Associa-
tion; and the Realtors. Their spending, however, totalled only about 20% of the spending done by
NCPAC which was by far the largest spender in the group. FED. ELECTION COMM. REC., Dec. 1983
at 8.
Calculation of the sum of all independent expenditures in support of Democrats and against
Republicans, demonstrates that Democrats benefitted from about $941,000 in independent expendi-
tures in 1982. A similar calculation of expenditures favoring Republicans demonstrates that they
benefitted from about $4.4 million in independent expenditures in the same year. 1 1981-82 FEC
REPORT, supra note 24 at 110, 119.
31. See generally, H. ALEXANDER, supra note 15.
32. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1982).
33. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
34. Id. at 43. This case involved the constitutionality of certain provisions in the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. § 431) and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. § 9001) regulat-
ing the public financing of Presidential election campaigns. Groups of individuals including federal
officeholders, candidates, and political organizations brought an action against the Federal Election
Commission and other governmental officials claiming that statutes in the Act violated the first and
fifth amendments.
The United States Supreme Court held: (1) that ceilings imposed on political contributions did not
violate constitutional rights but rather may help limit corruption or the appearance thereof; (2) that
limits on political expenditures by individuals, groups, and candidates violated the first amendment
right to free speech; (3) that limits on the amount of personal expenditures by a candidate were also
unconstitutional under the first amendment; (4) that reporting and disclosure provisions did not vio-
late constitutional rights; (5) that provisions for public financing of Presidential nominating conven-
tions and primary campaigns were constitutional; (6) that the provisions establishing a scheme for
public financing of Presidential election campaign expenses did not violate the first amendment; (7)
that the method of appointing members of the Federal Election Commission violated the separation of
powers principle in the appointments clause; and (8) that de facto validity would be accorded to the
Commission's past acts, and the Court's judgment would be stayed for up to 30 days during which
time the commission would function de facto.
35. Id. at 39, 45-48, 53, 55-56. The decision did not affect one expenditure limit: the $1,000 limit applica-
ble to spending by PACs in a publicly-financed presidential campaign. 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0 (1976).
That limit was struck down in Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 496 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982). Since the Supreme Court was split evenly in that
case, it had not yet settled the issue.
A lower court decision held the limit unconstitutional. Democratic Party v. Nat'l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 52 U.S.L.W. 2369 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The FEC appealled to the Supreme
Court. FED. ELECTION COMM. REC., Jan. 1984, at 9. The PACs were free to spend as they wished in
the 1984 election as they were in 1980, however. The Court upheld the lower court, finding the limit
unconstitutional, as this issue was going to press.
36. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1982). See also H. ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 318-19. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(2)(C) defines contribution or expenditure not to include "the establishment, administration,
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nected PACs must cover these costs with monies collected from contributors. 37 In
addition, much of the money the nonconnected PACs spend in direct-mail fun-
draising must be listed as "independent expenditures" in support of candidates.3"
Thus, classifying these costs as "independent expenditures" distorts the percep-
tion of nonconnected PAC contributions, making them seem more significant
than they actually are. For example, in the 1980 presidential election, PACs pro-
vided $10.6 million in independent spending for Ronald Reagan, but this amount
included the cost of direct-mail fundraising.39 The amount which actually went
into media advertising for Mr. Reagan was probably no more than one-third of
that amount. 4° In contrast, the connected PACs used about $30 million from
their connected organizations to cover their administrative and fundraising
costs.
4t
Remarkably, the major connected PACs seem not to have discovered the in-
dependent spending device used so aggressively by NCPAC and other noncon-
nected PACs. PACs supporting President Carter in his 1980 re-election campaign
did almost no independent spending of this sort.42
President Carter, however, did substantially better than Mr. Reagan in an-
other category of independent spending known as "communications costs." ' 4 3 Un-
ions may spend money to communicate political views to their members, and
corporations may do the same with their shareholders.' Unions, which generally
supported President Carter, spent far more on "communications costs" than did
corporations, which were more likely to support Mr. Reagan.45
Communications costs differ from the other independent expenditures in sev-
eral respects. First, a union or corporation may meet communications costs di-
rectly by using treasury funds from the organization. This use of treasury monies
is permitted because the money to pay communications costs need not have been
voluntarily contributed to a PAC.4 6 Second, disclosure of expenditures is less
stringent with respect to communications costs. 4 7 In addition, the requirement of
independence from the candidate is somewhat less stringent with respect to com-
munications costs.4 8 Nonetheless, too much control by the candidate could make
and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a
corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital
stock."
37. 2 U.S.C. § 432(h)(1) (1982).
38. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(vi) (1982).
39. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 318.
40. Id. at 131. Even the connected PACs, which have the option to expend administrative funds from the
treasury of the sponsoring organization, spend about one-third of contributed money for
administration.
41. Id.
42. Independent spending in support of President Carter amounted to only $18,000 before the nomination
and only $27,000 thereafter. 1 FED. ELECTION COMM., FEC REPORTS ON FINANCIAL ACTIVITY
1979-80: FINAL REPORT, PARTY AND NON-PARTY POLITICAL COMMIrEES 117.
43. In 1980, Democratic presidential candidates received $2.2 million in reported communications costs
while Republicans got just $300,000. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 122-23. Communication costs
are those costs incurred in communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate. Much of this spending goes unreported because only costs exceeding $2,000 per
candidate must be disclosed. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) (1982); 11 C.F.R. § 100.8(b)(4) (1984).
44. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2)(A) (1982).
45. Actual communications costs in the 1980 presidential race were estimated at $15 million for Carter
and $1.5 million for Reagan. Alexander, The Regulation and Funding of Presidential Elections, I J.
LAW & POL. 43, 54 (1983). Republicans did better in 1982 receiving 56.8% of the total of $134,000 in
communications costs reported in the 1982 election. 1 1981-82 FEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 54.
46. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(2)(C) (1982). See supra note 36.
47. See supra note 43.
48. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A) (1982) provides that the term "contribution or expenditure" shall not in-
clude "communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel
and their families or by a labor organization to its members and their families on any subject."
1985]
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the spending an illegal contribution or expenditure.4 9 Considering all of the ways
in which the parties evaded the ostensible spending limit in the 1980 presidential
race, it is remarkable that neither candidate achieved a substantial spending
advantage.5"
In both 1980 and 1982, conservative PACs, especially NCPAC, opposed sev-
eral liberal Democrats seeking Senate re-election. 1 Republican campaign spend-
ing substantially exceeded Democratic spending in only one of those races.52 In
fact, only by counting total independent expenditures, including all fundraising
costs53 necessary to offset the advantage of incumbency, can one demonstrate any
49. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C). See also H. ALEXANDER, supra note 15.
50. Alexander, supra note 45, at 54. Alexander states total spending for Mr. Reagan's campaign as $64.6
million and for President Carter's campaign as $53.93 million. Id. He estimated the "communications
cost" spending at $15 million, substantially more than was disclosed. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note
15. He did not, however, adjust the independent expenditure total which gave Reagan nearly all of his
spending margin. As Alexander notes elsewhere, only about one-third of the $10.6 million in reported
independent expenditures for Reagan actually went for media advertising. H. ALEXANDER, supra note
15, at 318-19. Once that amount has been deducted, the spending totals would be about $57 million for
Reagan to $54 million for Carter - hardly a significant difference and certainly not sufficient to
overcome Carter's incumbency advantages.
51. See supra note 33.




'80 Church (D) 1,917,237
Symms (R) 1,780,777
'80 McGovern (D) 2,757,201
Abdnor (R) 1,801,653
'80 Bayh (D) 2,751,004
Quayle (R) 2,289,838
'80 Culver (D) 1,750,680
Grassley (R) 2,183,028
'82 Kennedy (D) 976,985
Shamie (R) 1,027,545
'82 Sarbanes (D) 399,339
Hogan (R) 210,760
The 1980 spending figures are from 1979-80 FEC REPORTS, U.S. Senate and House Campaigns,
Final Report 221-22, 413-14, 239-40, 245-52. The 1982 spending figures are from 1981-82 FEC RE-
PORTS, U.S. Senate and House Campaigns, Interim Report # 1, 189-90, 183-84. Only Senator Culver
spent substantially less than his opponent, and he had the advantage of incumbency.
53. Besides including fundraising costs, the independent expenditure totals include funds spent for mail-
ings directed to persons already solidly committed to the candidate or not resident in the particular
state or district and therefore not eligible to vote for the candidate. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at
400.
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dollar superiority for Republicans. 54 Most importantly, while all four targeted
Democrats lost in 1980, the two targeted candidates won in 1982, despite the
independent expenditure blitz.
55
Thus, PACs are not the cause of the problems faced by Democrats who have
been losing elections and legislative battles:
[Although] moneyed interests swarm all over Capitol Hill . . . [that] does not
mean that money rules the roost . . . . PACs tend to check each other...
[and] there are other checks on their power. One is the spotlight of public
attention focused by the press, groups like Common Cause, and other politi-
cians. Another is the obstacle course of enacting any legislation. American
democracy is still working to accommodate conflicting interests and ideals.
56
54. TOTAL OF DIRECT AND INDEPENDENT




'80 Church (D) 1,919,182
Symms (R) 2,200,607
'80 McGovern (D) 2,760,754
Abdnor (R) 2,037,374
'80 Bayh (D) 2,752,031
Quayle (R) 2,473,762
'80 Culver (D) 1,810,264
Grassley (R) 2,413,933
'82 Kennedy (D) 977,485
Shamie (R) 1,680,781
'82 Sarbanes (D) 419,443
Hogan (R) 709,323
The 1980 figures are taken from 1979-80 FEC REPORTS, U.S. SENATE AND HOUSE CAMPAIGNS,
FINAL REPORT 221-26, 413-18, 239-44, 245-56. The 1982 figures are taken from 1981-82 FEC RE-
PORTS, U.S. SENATE AND HOUSE CAMPAIGNS, INTERIM REPORT #1, 189-94, 183-88.
55. See supra note 52. In 1977, incumbency was estimated to be worth about $500,000 in a Senate race.
The advantages of an incumbent include salary, staff, the franking privilege, and office and travel
allowances. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM
146, 154-55 (2d ed. 1980).
Only in the Culver-Grassley race could it be said that total spending for the Republican (Grassley)
might have been sufficient to overcome the Democrat's incumbency advantage. Interestingly, Senator






























The percentages are from 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 25-B (1980) and 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2792,
2819 (1982).
56. Samuelson, The Campaign Reform Failure, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 5, 1983, at 28, 34.
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REFORM PROPOSALS
Senator Chiles indicates his lack of enthusiasm for further efforts to limit PAC
contributions, pointing out the constitutional difficulties of banning or even reduc-
ing the $5,000 contribution limit." He also expresses skepticism about the propo-
sal to limit the aggregate amount a candidate could accept from PACs. The
Senator's skepticism is likewise based on anticipated constitutional problems and
on his perception that such a limit, would favor incumbents and hurt challen
ers.59 Indeed, many features of the current campaign law do favor incumbents.
This "favoritism" may be viewed as inevitable since incumbents wrote the current
legislation and would write any reform legislation. Nevertheless, pragmatic con-
cerns must be addressed before valid conclusions can be drawn regarding future
reforms.
First, further restrictions on contributions, or even the failure to raise the ex-
isting limits, will likely result in measures to circumvent the restrictions. 6 ' Sec-
ond, recent growth of all types of independent expenditures is probably due to
unreasonably low expenditure limits in the presidential elections and unreasona-
bly low contribution limits in Senate and House races. Independent expenditures
could mushroom if connected PACs decide to engage in "independent spending"
as have the nonconnected PACs.62 Continued adherence to unreasonable limits
will force interest groups in that direction. Indeed, unions spent enormous sums
in the "communications costs" category during the 1984 presidential primaries.6 3
Senator Chiles asserts that raising individual contribution limits will not offset
the power of the PACs because only a few wealthy individuals are likely to con-
tribute more money. 64 He overlooks the fact that individuals can give $5,000 to a
PAC but only $1,000 to a candidate. 65 Would it not be preferable to have individ-
uals give more money to a candidate for the candidate's own use rather than sup-
porting an independent spending PAC which might use the funds to distort the
issues or engage in destructive negative campaigns? A donor would presumably
57. Chiles, supra note 1, at 213.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The most obvious example of legislative favoritism for incumbents is the equal spending limit for an
incumbent President and a challenger. The large independent expenditure total for then-candidate
Reagan was in part a reaction to this perceived disadvantage to a challenger. In 1972, President Nixon \
spent $61 million and McGovern spent $30 million. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 104. Neverthe-
less, the spending limit applicable in 1980, after adjustment for inflation, was just over $29 million.
FED. ELECTION COMM., ANNUAL REPORT 1981 7 (1981).
61. Between 1976 and 1982 the average cost of a successful race for the House rose from $87,240 to
$214,767 but the contribution limits remained the same. 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 723 (1983);
Chiles, supra note 1, at 213.
62. See supra notes 29, 42 and accompanying text.
63. Labor unions spent heavily in the "communications costs" category to help Walter Mondale win the
1984 Democratic presidential nomination. Jackson, Old Time Politics, WALL ST. J., July 5, 1984, at 1,
col. 1; Apcar, Stunned by Mondale Defeats, Unions Face a Problem: Ally Hart is Hard to Criticize,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1984, at 52, col. 1. For discussion of "communications costs," see supra notes 43-
48 and accompanying text.
Union PACs gave large sums to local Mondale delegate committees which then engaged in what
purported to be independent spending in support of Mondale in their local areas. One reason for the
tactic was Mondale's vow that he would accept no PAC contributions. Jackson, Hart Campaign Files
Protest Over Money for Mondale Groups, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1984, at 22, col. 1. The device also
enabled Mondale to exceed the spending ceiling in some states. See Jackson, Mondale Spending Ex-
ceeded Ceiling in New Hampshire, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1984, at 46, col. 1. After suffering from the
attacks of his opponents and the media, Mondale decided to terminate the committees and return the
funds. Weinraub, Mondale Directs Disputed Groups to End Operation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1984, at
1, col. 8.
64. Chiles, supra note 1, at 214.
65. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(C) (1982).
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prefer to give political money directly to his favorite candidate rather than con-
tribute indirectly through a PAC. Independent expenditures pose the risk that
candidates will lose control of their own campaigns.
Finally, Senator Chiles addresses the issue of public financing, mentioning the
"apparent success" of publicly financed presidential campaigns.' But the Senator
failed to mention the enormous amount of money independently spent to avoid
the expenditure ceilings which go with the receipt of the federal funds." In addi-
tion, he fails to mention the 1979 amendments to the law to facilitate "party build-
ing activities.",68 These amendments permit state and local party committees to
collect money from corporations, unions, and individuals - money which other-
wise could not be contributed legally in federal elections.6 9 The national parties
are then free to direct this money for activities, such as advertising, in support of
the party generally (or its entire slate of candidates, including federal candidates)
and voter registration drives. Financial disclosure is poor because it is governed
mainly by state laws.7 °
Congress has recognized that the presidential campaign funding mechanism
provides far less money than is required for financing a presidential campaign but
has been unwilling to address the problem directly. Instead, private money has
simply been permitted to flow surreptitiously into the campaigns.
Problems similar to those afflicting public financing of presidential campaigns
undoubtedly will plague any scheme of publicly-financed Senate or House elec-
tions. Incumbents will seek to set low expenditure limits in order to disadvantage
challengers. Moreover, independent spending practices will probably destroy
whatever limits are imposed because it has become clear that PACs and lobby
groups will not be denied the opportunity to assist candidates they favor.
It is clear that in our government-regulated and government-subsidized na-
tion, interest groups will find ways to reward their friends and punish their foes.
PACs are simply an efficient way to aggregate individual contributions and iden-
tify them with their contributors' interests. In their defense, one may note that
contributions and independent expenditures are subject to stringent disclosure
rules. 7 1 In this way they are fundamentally unlike the contributions and expendi-
tures which were made in the past, often in violation of the law.
At best, public financing of House and Senate races may stimulate lawful and
properly-disclosed independent spending. Even that modest result, however,
raises the specter of a campaign in which most media advertising is provided inde-
66. Chiles, supra note 1, at 214-15.
67. For a thorough summary of that activity in the 1980 election, see Alexander, supra note 45, at 54-59.
68. Party building activities are facilitated by the 1979 amendments to the Code. First, the term "contri-
bution" does not include payment by a state or local committee of a political party for the costs of
preparation or mailing of a printed slate or sample ballot card or the display of such an advertising, 2
U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(v) (1982); payment by a state or local committee of a political party of the costs of
campaign materials used by the committee in connection with the volunteer activities on behalf of the
nominees of the party, 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(x) (1982); or the payment by a state or local committee for
voter registration and get out the vote activities, 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii) (1982). Second, the term
"expenditure" does not include: the display, preparation or mailing of a sample ballot card, 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(8)(B) (1982); the payment of compensation for legal or accounting services by the party, 2
U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(vii) (1982); and the payment by a state or local committee of voter registration and
get out the vote activities, 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(ix) (1982). A helpful discussion of these provisions is
found in T. SCHWARTZ & A. STRAUs, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLIT-
ICAL ACTiviTy § 5.04 (1982).
69. E. DREW, supra note 23, at 102-110.
70. See Alexander, supra note 45, at 56-57; E. DREW, supra note 23, at 14-19.
71. See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1983). This code section contains strict reporting and filing requirements by the
principal campaign committee other than authorized candidate committees and by every person who
makes independent expenditures in excess of $250 in a year.
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pendently of candidates. At worst, the expenditure limits imposed by public fi-
nancing could drive interest groups back to under-the-table campaign financing.
THE STUDY COMMISSION
Senator Chiles recognizes the difficulty of enacting legislation to deal with
PACs.7 2 He proposes the creation of a study commission as a means of establish-
ing a consensus with respect to the dangers of PACs and the means of dealing
with them. 73 If the Senate and House continue to be controlled by different par-
ties, legislation in this area will be very unlikely, particularly in light of President
Reagan's reelection. 74 Thus far, only Democrats have shown any real enthusiasm
for attempting to curb the power of PACs.75
Senator Chiles describes his approach as "a half loaf now and a half loaf
later.",76 In reality, however, enactment of the proposal would merely allow Con-
gress to appear to be resolving the problems associated with PACs without actu-
ally doing anything significant. Unless PACs were represented on the
commission, there could be no realistic hope of reaching a solution. Moreover,
without a consensus that reform is needed the commission mechanism is unlikely
to produce anything useful. The National Commission on Social Security Re-
form, which the Senator cites as a model, 77 operated under the pressure of poten-
tial insolvency of the Social Security System. The Commission was forced to take
action.78 No such urgency exists regarding the PACs' role in the electoral
process.
Senator Chiles' other example, the National Commission on Federal
Paperwork,79 is only a slightly more suitable model insofar as it dealt with a less
urgent issue but one for which there existed some bipartisan consensus. No such
consensus exists or is likely to develop regarding the PAC issue.
Finally, Senator Chiles correctly observes that "[flew issues directly and per-
sonally concern members of Congress more than campaign finance."80 For that
additional reason legislative consensus seems unattainable and his proposed com-
mission will likely accomplish little. More importantly, no effective restrictions
on PACs will survive a constitutional challenge unless the Supreme Court dra-
matically changes its views on spending limits."' Without such changes, in-
dependent expenditures will continue to be permissible, and this spending will
likely subvert any plan which could be designed. At worst, the level of independ-
ent expenditures could eventually put effective control of a campaign in the hands
of independent-spending PACs rather than candidates.
72. Chiles, supra note 1, at 215-16.
73. Id.
74. See E. DREW, supra note 23, at 102-103, 128-129, 155.
75. See E. DREW, supra note 23 at 102-103, 117, 155.
76. Chiles, supra note 1, at 216.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 216 n.218. "The Commission on Social Security Reform was formed by President Reagan in
1981 in order to propose a plan to insure short and long-term solvency of the Social Security System."
79. See COMMISSION OF FEDERAL PAPERWORK, A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL
PAPERWORK, FINAL SUMMARY REPORT (Oct. 3, 1977).
80. Chiles, supra note 1, at 217.
81. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. But see E. DREW, supra note 23, at 134-135. Drew
suggests that in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-51, the Court opened another route by which private money
could be used in Presidential campaigns when it held that the federal election law's prohibition of
independent spending of more than $1,000 on any election by individuals or groups was a violation of
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. In this manner, freedom of speech was equated
with money.
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CONCLUSION
Reform-minded legislators should limit their efforts to tinkering with the ex-
isting system. Contribution and expenditure limits should be increased. Disclo-
sure should be improved. Steps should be taken to stimulate individual
contributions to candidates rather than PACs.
Given the present balance between the parties and the present posture of the
Supreme Court, benign neglect might well be the best reform strategy. Mainte-
nance of the status quo is preferable to the problems which would likely be caused
by major reform proposals. As experience with prior campaign legislation has
shown, the unforeseen problems may well be worse than the evils towards which
the reformers direct their attention.
